1.9.2. Quotes Relevant to “Group Psychology” and Toscanini

1.9.2.1. Freud (1914)

Idealization is a process that concerns the object; by it that object, without any alteration in its nature, is aggrandized and exalted in the subject's mind. Idealization is possible in the sphere of ego-libido as well as in that of object-libido. For example, the sexual overvaluation of an object is an idealization of it.

1.9.2.2. Yeats (1926)

Yeats, WB (1926). Among schoolchildren

Labour is blossoming or dancing where
The body is not bruised to pleasure soul.
Nor beauty born out of its own despair,
Nor blear-eyed wisdom out of midnight oil.
O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?

1.9.2.3. Strachey (1934)


It seems likely enough that when Freud wrote ... that the favourable change in the patient 'is made possible by alterations in the ego' he was thinking, in part at all events, of that portion of the ego which he subsequently separated off into the super-ego. Quite apart from this, moreover, in another of Freud's more recent works, the Group Psychology (1921), there are passages which suggest a different point—namely, that it may be largely through the patient's super-ego that the analyst is able to influence him. These passages occur in the course of his discussion on the nature of hypnosis and suggestion. He definitely rejects Bernheim's view that all hypnotic phenomena are traceable to the factor of suggestion, and adopts the alternative theory that suggestion is a partial manifestation of the state of hypnosis. The state of hypnosis, again, is found in certain respects to resemble the state of being in love. There is 'the same humble subjection, the same compliance, the same absence of criticism towards the hypnotist as towards the loved object'; in particular, there can be no doubt that the hypnotist, like the loved object, 'has stepped into the place of the subject's ego-ideal'. It seems to follow that the analyst owes his effectiveness, at all events in some respects, to his having stepped into the place of the patient's super-ego. Thus there are two convergent lines of argument which point to the patient's super-ego as occupying a key position in analytic therapy: it is a part of the patient's mind in which a favourable alteration would be likely to lead to general improvement, and it is a part of the patient's mind which is especially subject to the analyst's influence. The analyst temporarily takes over the functions of the patient's super-ego during the treatment and by so doing in some way alters it.

1.9.2.4. Reich (1953)

The impact of narcissistic injuries, ... may lead to a ... revival of primitive, narcissistic ego ideals.

The externalization of such an ego ideal, and its fusion with a love object, represents a form of narcissistic object choice ...

Need for identification, not infrequently in the form of ecstatic ... flowing together with the idealized object, can become the basis for a subservient relationship ...

The masochistic element in such subservience is frequently based on the overcompensation of aggressive feelings

Idealization and identification with the idealized object may represent the only available form of substitution for the lacking ability to form object relationships

1.9.2.5. Greenacre (1957)


The continued strength of the illusion of self-world unity appears to be reflected in the tendency towards mystical and ecstatic experiences which ... Greenacre (1957) describes as artists’ 'sense of fusion with the outer world in a state of mutual permeability'. In regard to the self determining reality, Greenacre (1957) speaks of the artist’s God complex ...


1.9.2.6. Olden (1958)


Freud, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego(1921), stresses the significance of empathy. In the chapter on "Identification" he mentions empathy in the following footnote: "A path leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards another mental life" (p. 110).

1.9.2.7. Schafer (1959)


In extensive discussions of psychoanalytic technique, Freud (16), W. Reich (44), Fenichel (9), Glover (20), and Menninger (35) are not concerned with the concept of empathy as such. Freud refers to it in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (18, p. 70) as '... the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all toward another’s mental life', thus calling attention to its fundamental importance; but surprisingly he says no more about it. In elaborating this comment by Freud, while elucidating the psychology of identification, Fenichel comments: 'Empathy—viz., the intuitive grasp of the real psychic states of another person—is closely related to such [narcissistic] identification but is not identical with it' (7, p. 104);

1.9.2.8. Schafer (1960)
The assistant concertmaster of the Philharmonic recalled, "we were playing fortissimo in some piece; and he stopped and said to one player, the second clarinet or someone like that: 'Did you play this note? Because I didn't hear you.' And the man said: 'No, I didn't play it'" (Bolognini, 1967).

He had established his dominance over the orchestra of the Metropolitan Opera when, during their first rehearsal, he heard the cellos play a note which was incorrectly copied into their parts, one which no previous conductor had ever noticed. This ability to hear every note brought pressure on every player to "be there at every moment ... although the eyes didn't see you, the ears heard" (Wallenstein, 1967). The result was "that a hundred people [had] this immediate mental contact", something which "happened with no other conductor in my fifty years of playing" (Burghauser, 1967).

To protect and comfort, in a nonrandom fashion, just as to love and punish, one must know at least a little of what is going on. Freud said in his Group Psychology that the superego tests reality (1921, p. 77) and then, in The Ego and the Id, he emphatically retracted this statement (1923, p. 34). He could have meant only external reality in this retraction for otherwise he repeatedly emphasized that the superego knows the id better than the ego does; and that it observes, watches over, judges, and censors the ego (1930, p. 93), guides it (1932, p. 89), corrects it (1938, p. 121), cares for it (1938, p. 122), and protects it (1926, p. 167); (1928a, pp. 220-221): "... nothing is hidden from the superego, not even thoughts" (1930, p. 79). All these attainments and activities imply a reality-testing function. We know that Freud ascribed observing and reality testing also to the ego; therefore, we must conclude that he meant to refer observation of the inner world for the sake of moral evaluation and regulation to the superego, and fact finding, organizing, and executive observation of the inner and outer worlds to the ego. Ultimately he would have maintained that observation of any sort is an ego function because he saw the superego itself as a structure within the ego.

Also, if nothing is hidden from the superego, then it is implied that superego function, like ego function, is never entirely suspended. The superego may be more or less antagonistic, and thereby more or less observable in its effects on the ego, but it is ever on duty. When it is not critical, its tacit approval may be assumed.

1.9.2.9. Sandler (1960)


In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Freud expanded somewhat on his concept. He saw it as embodying "the sum of all the limitations in which the ego has to acquiesce ...," and he noted that "all the interplay between the external object and the ego as a whole ... may possibly be repeated upon this new scene of action within the ego." He emphasized again the positive rewarding aspect of the relationship between the ego and its ideal. When some thought or activity in the ego coincides with the standards of the ideal there results a feeling of triumph and release—a return to the state of primary narcissistic union with the parents.

In joining a group, the subject may give up his ego ideal and substitute for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader. The leader becomes invested with all the individual's idealized qualities, and the fact that other members of the group are doing the same thing leads to a reinforcement of this process by an identification of the group members with one another. The ego in turn is experienced as an object to the ego ideal.
In the condition of mania, we find the extreme and pathological instance of the feeling of narcissistic union with the parents, in which ego and ego ideal are completely at one, and the subject can blithely disregard feelings of social responsibility. Conversely, the sense of guilt and feelings of inferiority represent an expression of tension between the ego and the ideal, finding its extreme expression in the abject misery of the melancholic.

1.9.2.10. Sandler (1963)


In a comment on this passage Freud refers to his papers "On Narcissism" (1914) and "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917) for previous discussions of the "critical agency," and he gives the impression in the text (quoted above) of Group Psychology that the term "ego ideal" had been previously applied to the conscience. This is not in fact correct, for nowhere in "Mourning and Melancholia" does Freud refer to the ego ideal, and he specifically calls the "critical agency" the conscience. In "On Narcissism," moreover, the conscience was quite specifically distinguished from the ego ideal. It would appear that in Group Psychology Freud now condensed his two former concepts into one, extending the term "ego ideal" to cover the agency of conscience as well as the ideal which the individual has set up for himself. Although, no doubt influenced by his earlier consideration of melancholia, the ego ideal is seen as critical and punitive, it is still linked with the formulations in the paper "On Narcissism." For example, we read: "It is even obvious, in many forms of love choice, that the object serves as a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own. We love it on account of the perfections we have striven to reach for our own ego, and which we should now like to procure in this roundabout way as a means of satisfying our narcissism."

1.9.2.11. Meissner (1970)


But Freud now means to use identification in a new sense which is neither hysterical, narcissistic, nor regressive, does not require a preceding object relation, and provides the basis for his analysis of group formation. He approaches the problem of the constitution of groups by a comparison of identification with being in love. In the former the ego enriches itself by introjecting the object and thus acquiring the properties of the object. In the latter the ego, impoverished by its surrender to the object, substitutes the object for its own ego ideal. The object is thereby retained and is hypercathected at the expense of the ego, whereas in identification the object is lost but is then set up again as a partial alteration within the ego. The formulae used to describe identification are quite close to those used in the treatment of melancholy and narcissistic identification. The relation of being in love parallels that of hypnosis and Freud postulates the hypnotic relation as a specimen of two-member group formation which provides a model for the relation between the individual member and the group leader. The subject puts the hypnotist in the place of his ego ideal just as the lover puts the love object in the place of his ego ideal (13, pp. 115, 143). Thus the formula for the libidinal constitution of groups is evolved: a number of individuals 'put one and the same object in the place of their ego-ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego' (13, p. 116; 19, p. 67).

The social feeling so characteristic of groups is based on a reversal of originally hostile feelings (15, pp. 37, 43). The envy of the older child for the younger is changed to identification in the face of the impossibility of maintaining hostility without damage to himself. Young girls idolizing a popular singer renounce their jealousy in the face of the unattainability of the object and thus identify themselves with each other (13, p. 120). The reversal of hostility takes place by virtue of a common affectionate tie with a person outside the group. Identification carries with it a demand for equalization which applies to the members but not to the leader. 'Many equals, who can iden-
tify themselves with one another, and a single person superior to them all—that is the situation that we find realized in groups which are capable of subsisting' (13, p. 121). Thus libidinal structure of groups is derived from a double kind of tie: identification and the substitution of object for the ego ideal. A good soldier identifies with his comrades but he also takes his leader as an ideal. In the other great group which Freud takes as an example, the Christian church member identifies with other Christians and, like the soldier, takes Christ as an ideal; but in addition he must identify with Christ and love other Christians as Christ loved them (13, pp. 130, 134).

Note that, as in the analysis of melancholy, identifications pertain to the ego specifically as distinct from the critical agency or ego ideal. Moreover, the mutual tie between group members is in the nature of an identification based on the sharing of a common quality, the emotional tie with the leader (13, p. 108). This is the form of identification indicated by Freud in the third formula—one arising from the perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct. It is also important to note that Freud does not use the term 'introjection' in describing this form of identification whereas he uses it quite consistently in speaking of the narcissistic identification in melancholy. He also uses it in describing the genesis of a type of homosexuality in which intense Oedipal fixation on the mother does not transfer to other sexual objects at puberty but is transformed into an identification with her. The object is renounced but a substitute for it is provided by introjection of the lost object into the ego (13, p. 109; 14, p. 230). The effect is to remodel the ego in its sexual character according to the model provided by the object. In these cases the identification is by reason of the introject which does not pertain to the ego ideal but to the other part of the ego. That other part, as is clear in the analysis of group formation, can identify itself with other persons without any prior object relation and without any introjection.

1.9.2.12. Parkin (1976)


Freud first confined the metapsychological explanation of the process of recovery from melancholia to the suggestion that in that state the "accumulation of cathexis which is at first bound … after the work of melancholia is finished, becomes free and makes mania possible..." (1917, p. 258). In his return to the problem in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego(1921), Freud took up once more the conception of the ego ideal he had previously (1917) neglected, and even upheld his 1914 definition ("the heir to the original narcissism in which the childish ego enjoyed self-sufficiency" [1921, p. 110]), but it was clear that he no longer distinguished its functions from those of "self-observation, the moral conscience, the censorship of dreams, and the chief influence in repression" (1921, p. 110), which he was soon (1923) to attribute solely to the superego. The 1917 formulation of melancholia is repeated in its conceptualization as a state in which the ego is "divided, fallen apart into two pieces, one of which rages against the second" (1921, p. 109) and in which the second was once more identified as the ego into which the lost object has been introjected.

1.9.2.13. Friedman (1980)


In other words, from the primeval parent-child perfection, the maturing child differentiates two features: the controlling, defining, respected parental power and the parent’s enthusiasm for the child’s enthusiasm. The former grows into structures of pride, the latter into sources of ambition. Standards of performance come from the first; celebration of the self as performer from the second. A person needs something general to respect. And he must feel able to make himself special. Though interrelated, these needs have individual histories and manifest themselves in distinct ways throughout life.


[T]he depressive position ... is characterized by the ... recognition of, and capacity to apprehend, [the] object as a whole person and to accept ... ambivalence towards [it]. Here, idealization also plays a developmental role. This position is reached not only as a result of the increasing strength of the ego through maturation, but also through an increasing ability to possess and identify with a 'strong ideal object' (Segal, 1973, p. 67). Idealization then becomes the basis of the belief in the goodness of objects and of oneself, and is a precursor of good object relationships ... However, the depressive position was so named by Klein mainly because it is marked by the depressive anxiety that the forces of the death instinct will destroy the loved and ideal [object]. This anxiety is alleviated only by the hope that ... reparative impulses will tip the balance.

1.9.2.15. Winer (1989)


Charismatic susceptibility occurs when the follower undergoes an acute personal crisis that activates an unconscious fantasy of enforced passivity with respect to an active other. The charismatic leader presents himself through his mission or message as an identificatory object for the reversal to activity of enforced passivity in the object relationship. Leader and follower share the same unconscious fantasy. The follower passes through a stage of self-initiated repetition of passivity, followed by a stage of alternation and/or merger of self and object representations.

The charismatic leader must have an uncommon supply of physical energy, a gift for dramatization, an indefatigable capacity to kindle hope, and adroit skill at obtaining and handling power. But his specifically charismatic appeal lies in the leader's communication of an unconscious fantasy wherein he has reversed the situation of his own passively endured helplessness into one of activity vis-à-vis a passive other. He shares this fantasy via his mission or message ... In my model of the charismatic relationship, a current crisis of induced passivity in the potential follower activates his or her matching unconscious fantasy of traumatic passivity at the hands of an active other and the wish to identify with the active other to avoid painful affect. The charismatic leader serves as the identificatory object for the wished-for reversal. The follower's unconscious recognition of the matching patterns gives rise to the willingness to attribute special powers to the leader and the substitution of hope for despair.

To restate my formulation in other words, an acute personal crisis causes the reenactment of a repressed trauma (real or fantasied) in which the subject endures a specific passive position vis-à-vis an active other ... The charismatic leader's message or mission presents [an] unconscious fantasy in two stages—the first in which he was similarly passive, the second in which he has achieved activity. He serves as an identificatory model for the reversal of the enforced passivity to willed activity. His message or mission communicates the unconscious internalized object relationship in a disguised yet unconsciously discernible fashion. In fact, the messages of most charismatic leaders are so overdetermined and richly ambiguous that they carry more than one such unconscious fantasy.


To support his view of the significance of “Mourning and Melancholia,” Mitchell presented his understanding of the problems in Freud's theory building regarding the role of identification in psychic development. Recalling that “Mourning and Melancholia” had been written in conjunction with “On Narcissism,” he thought it safe to regard them as part of a crucial, step-by-step shift in Freud's vision of mind and psychopathology. Before these papers, Freud's emphasis had been on conflicts concerning infantile wishes for objects. Now Freud began to concern himself with how these objects become internalized. He stayed close to the clinical data in describing inner voices, the workings of conscience, and the residues of parental values, issues that seem to have taken on a prominence in these papers that was beginning to rival the importance of impulses and defense.

Freud's attention to internalized object relations led to a need to understand how internalization occurs. In “Mourning and Melancholia” Freud presents an account based entirely on drive economics. In pathological loss the object tie is preserved through internalization of the object via identification. This does not occur in normal mourning, where the lost object is given up because real, available objects offer greater possibilities for pleasure. The melancholic does not find this pleasure in new objects, because their original cathexis, characterized by narcissism and intense unconscious ambivalence, is different. The narcissistic nature of the object choice facilitates regression to identification, while oral, cannibalistic, and sadistic components make the internalization and abuse of the object highly pleasurable.

Mitchell noted that in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego Freud (1921) makes some remarks about identification that depart from the “Mourning and Melancholia” model and complicate the picture considerably. Here the concept is broadened; no longer a pathological mechanism but a general phenomenon of human development, identification is separated from object loss as its necessary condition. Very early identifications are now seen as “the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person,” a view, according to Mitchell, that took Freud beyond the boundaries of drive theory toward the kind of perspective later developed by pure object relations theorists like Fairbairn. Mitchell argued that these ideas about identification created a crisis in theory construction for Freud. He had either to create a new metapsychological framework in which to house and derive them or to find a way to account for them in terms of pure drive theory.

1.9.2.17. Chessick (2001)


At times Kohut seems so grandiose in this biography that he is almost psychotic, as, for example, in the description of his behavior in the hospital reported by a nurse (pp. 323–324) and his behavior at social gatherings, especially after he became ill (p. 234) ... Kohut could be very cruel and destructive at times, and at other times he could be very empathic and supportive. Everyone seems to agree that he had a certain charisma; using this, he engaged in the questionable procedure of gathering disciples around him, many of whom were his analysands or students, and, at least in some cases, exploiting them rather ruthlessly and publicly humiliating them.

Nobody could deny that Kohut had an extraordinary mind, “arrogant and peculiar” (p. 139) as he was, but some of his disciples carried matters to an extreme in their idealization of him. He was an elitist (p. 114) who had no patience with those who had less education or culture than himself, and he aroused a great deal of envy among his colleagues. It did not help that “he was never open about himself, and was generally remote” (p. 128) and that “he was very impressed with himself” (p. 177). In summary, he manifested poor interpersonal relationships, especially in matters of intimacy ...

1.9.2.18. Milrod (2002)

In 1917 Freud went on to describe, in effect, the superego raging at the ego (or self representation) in melancholia. Then, in 1921, focusing on group psychology, he described how members of a group replace their individual ego ideals with a shared ego ideal embodied in the group leader. After he developed the structural theory in 1923, the ego ideal became synonymous in his writings with the superego and disappeared as a term until 1933, when he again said that the superego was “the vehicle of the ego ideal by which the ego measures itself, which it emulates, and whose demand for ever greater perfection it strives to fulfill.”


Within the field of pastoral psychotherapy, ... many pastoral psychotherapists sensed that the [concept] of idealization ... could be very directly used as ways of understanding their patients’ spiritual and religious experiences. Rector (2000) has written, for instance, on the twinship pole of development and its usefulness in conceptualizing religious and spiritual phenomena.


1.9.2.20. Lansky (2003)


In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Freud looked at the transference of moral and other regulatory functions from group members onto the leader of the group. The leader clearly is an external portrayal of what is later introjected as the conscience in its entirety. This is a social model of the incompatible idea—one may be ashamed or guilty before the leader of the group: What one is or what one does or fails to do may be incompatible with the approval of the leader. What was 2 years later called the superego serves a self-evaluative function and is derived from internalizations that basically serve to adapt to the demands of external authorities.

The examination of group dynamics in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Freud, 1921), which also contains profound implications for the concept of transference, was followed shortly by The Ego and the Id (Freud, 1923), in which the terms ego, id, and superego were introduced for the first time. Here, the superego, the self-observing part of the ego, is formed from internalizations, and itself forms the moral link between the individual and the outside interpersonal world. It is a natural progression from the 1921 work insofar as the superego becomes the internalization of the leader, with the ego standing to the conscience as the group does to its leader. What may be hidden from the potentially retaliative or rejecting group leader (i.e., what is incompatible with that person’s set of ideals and prohibitions) becomes, by analogy, that which is extruded from the consciousness of the individual because of fear of the superego. The basic
model of the incompatible idea has been expanded to include psychic structure: The superego (conscience in its entirety) is the audience and judge of the activities of the ego.

Freud lost this perspective on the conscience the following year (1922). Under the sway of his study of (male) development, Freud took up only those aspects of conscience concerned with transgression and retaliation. It is important to note here that Freud bypassed attention to the ego-ideal aspect of the conscience and constricted the usage of superego to part of the conscience. Unfortunately, Freud's restriction and distortion of the superego concept in the 1923, 1924, and 1925 works has remained a source of confusion to this day.

1.9.2.21. Fosha (2005)


The True Other is an external presence who facilitates our being who we believe ourselves to be, who we are meant to be, someone who is instrumental in helping to actualize a sense of True Self.